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THE CASE FOR CERTIFICATION
INTRODUCTION
Much concern has recently arisen over the excessive delay in the
American court systems. An element of this delay can often be attrib-
uted to the uncertainty surrounding the determination of "state law"
by the federal courts.'
This note will discuss the inter-jurisdictional certification procedure
utilized by the federal courts when faced with the task of interpreting
uncertain state law. 2 Under this procedure, the federal court may stay
proceedings by applying the abstention doctrine and send a certified
question to the state's highest court requesting an interpretation of the
unsettled law. The state court may then answer the question and certify
the answer back to the federal court.3 The suit may thereupon be
resumed, the federal court applying the certified interpretation of state
law. It is the premise of this note that this certification procedure offers
promise of easing the delay-causing burdens of the federal courts.
BASIS FOR ABSTENTION AND CERTIFICATION-WHAT IS STATE LAw?
In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins4 the United States Supreme Court reversed
Swift v. Tyson,5 a rule of one hundred years' duration, which had re-
1. See, e.g., Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Co-
operative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344 (1963).
2. The technique of certifying a question of law from a lower to a higher state court
varies greatly in scope and procedure. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, §§ 88, 98 (1958); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 59.42 (Supp. 1960); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4529 to -4530 (1959); GA. CONST.
art. 6, § 2-3704; HAwAii REv. LAws §§ 211-1, -2 (1955); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-1512,
-2220(f); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4449 (1968); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 211, § 6;
id. ch. 214, § 30, id. ch. 215, § 13 (1958). See generally Vestal, The Certified Question of
Law, 36 IowA L. REv. 629 (1951).
3. All certification procedures provide that the answering of a question certified to a
state court is within the discretion of such court. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1968); FLA.
App. R. 4.61; HAwAI REv. STAT. §§ 602-36, -37 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57
(Supp. 1970); ME. R. Civ. P. 76B; MoNT. Sup. CT. R. 1; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 490:
Api. R. 21, § 1 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 2.60.020 (Supp. 1969).
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. 47 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). For a more detailed analysis of the impact of Swift
v. Tyson, see, e.g., Sharp & Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
since 1900, 4 IN. LJ. 367 (1929); Teton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REv.
519 (1941). For the widespread criticism of the case after the decision in Black & White
Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), see, e.g., Campbell,
Is Swift v. Tyson an Argument for or against Abolishing Diversity of Citizenship Juris-
diction, 28 ILL. L. REv. 356, 362-64 (1933); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
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quired the federal courts to follow only state statutes, or long-established
local custom having the force of law, in compliance with the Rules of
Decision Act.6 The Court in its new interpretation of "the laws of the
several states" clause held that the law to be applied was to be the
law of the state, whether that law was declared by its legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision.8 The source of the law was
not the concern of the federal court.
The Erie Doctrine was pressed further by the Court when it held
that in any area of substantive concern, where the outcome would be
affected, state not federal law must be applied.' The outgrowth of these
interpretations of the "state law" clause in Erie-Guaranty was to increase
the burden on the federal courts to determine what precisely the state
law was in a particular case. Judge Clark was quick to recognize this
situation soon after the Erie decision. He stated that when state law is
"... confused or nonexistent ... [this is] without hesitation, . . .the
most troublesome.., of all the rules based upon the Tompkins case." "I
Although there have been some limits placed on the Erie Doctrine,1
its basis remains unchanged-the responsibility of a federal court to
determine what constitutes state law is not abrogated just because there
is no state law or because it is difficult to ascertain.12
Between Federal and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Shelton, Concurrent
Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and its Dangers, 15 VA. L. REv. 137 (1928).
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92, provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply.
7. Id.
8. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
9. This is the "outcome-determinative" test set forth in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
10. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290 (1946).
11. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (where there are
"affirmative countervailing considerations"-here the right to trial by jury under the
seventh amendment-they may outweigh the "outcome" test), conmented on, 43
MrNN. L. REv. 580 (1959). Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure take precedence over the Erie Doctrine and are to be followed
regardless of any state law to the contrary), commented on, Holtzoff, A Landmark in
Federal Procedural Reform, 10 VILL. L. REv. 701 (1965); Zabin, The Federal Rules in
Diversity Cases, Erie in Retreat, 53 A.B.A.J. 266 (1967). See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAw oF
FEDRAL CouRTS § 60 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WxunrrJ (The Erie Doctrine
and federal common law).
12. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 288 (1943). See also Propper v.




In recent years, however, federal courts have utilized the procedure
of staying proceedings and deferring to the state court on an issue of
local law. This has become known as the abstention doctrine. 3
The reasons for abstention are varied and many. Wright, in his
treatise on the federal court system, 4 divides the abstention doctrine
into four "abstention doctrines".
Thus abstention is variously recognized: (1) to avoid decision
of a federal constitutional question where the case may be dis-
posed of on questions of state law; (2) to avoid needless conflict
with the administration by a state of its own affairs; (3) to leave
to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law; and
(4) to ease the congestion of the federal court docket.15
The first aspect of the abstention doctrine is appropriately utilized
Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490
(1946); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) wherein Chief Justice
Marshall said:
It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not:
but it's equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should .... With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must
decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.
The Mereditb doctrine has been followed by the lower federal courts, e.g., Food Fair
Stores v. Food Fair, 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949). See WurGHT, supra note 11, at 240 nn.
29, 30. But see United States v. City of Tacoma, 330 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964).
13. See, e.g., Libenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case, its Effect on the
Abstention Doctrine, and Some Suggested Solutions, 18 WEsr. REs. L. REV. 157 (1966);
Nieto, The Abstention Doctrine, 40 DENVER L. CENTER J. 45 (1963); Wright, The Ab-
stention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TxAs L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, An Exercise in
Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959). The vast amount of writing on this subject
is cited in 1 W. BAREoN & A. HoLTzorF, FEDERAL PlAcncE Am PRocEDuRE § 64 n. 44 (C.
Wright ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BAmoN & HoLTzoITI.
The abstention doctrine has not met with universally favorable comment. See Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Clark, State Law in
the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YAIE L.J. 267
(1946). Clark's dislike for the abstention doctrine showed in his decisions, see, e.g.,
Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1953). See also Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE LJ. 762 (1941) (Erie
should not be interpreted so as to require federal judges to be bound by laws of a state
made by judges of that state's courts. Corbin stressed that federal judges use their
"judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and paste pot". Id. at 775).
14. WiRGHT, supra note 11.
15. Id. at 196.
19711
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
in suits asking for equitable relief.' 6 It is believed in that situation that
the federal court should abstain if the state's interpretation of an issue
pertaining to uncertain17 state law may avoid a federal constitutional
question as to the validity of a statute.'
The second facet of the abstention doctrine is applied when a deci-
sion by a federal court would necessarily involve determination of a
state's domestic policy or would result in an unnecessary interference
with the action of state regulatory activities at the administrative stage? 9
The reason for abstention here is to avoid federal-state friction, since
intervention by the federal court might endanger the success of state
policies. -0
16. The leading case on this aspect of the abstention doctrine (sometimes called the
Pullman Doctrine) is Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The basis for staying proceedings in the federal court is the hope that a state court
determination of an issue of state law will avoid the federal court having to decide a
federal constitutional question. This first "abstention doctrine" has been followed time
and again by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167
(1959); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 353 U.S. 220 (1957); Albertson v. Millard,
345 U.S. 242 (1953); A.F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Alabama State Fed'n of
Labor, Local 103 v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest
Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of North Kansas City,
276 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1960); Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Co. v. Nims,
252 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1958); PotomacElec. Power Co. v. Fugate, 275 F. Supp. 566 (E.D.
Va. 1967); Jehovah's Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1
(Harborview), 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1967); Wackenhut
Corp. v. Aponte, 266 F. Supp. 401 (D.P.R. 1966), aff'd, 386 U.S. 268 (1967). See 1
BAu RoN & HorTzoFr', supra note 13, at 64, n.51.
17. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (If the state law is fairly open to
interpretation then the federal court should stay its proceedings until the state courts
have been allowed an opportunity to pass on the issue.).
18. This follows the policy of the Supreme Court, in avoiding determination of
constitutional questions if at all possible, by deciding on other grounds. Siler v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R., 360 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). But see Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241 (1967); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964). Where state law is settled this par-
ticular aspect of the abstention doctrine is inapplicable. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 US.
528 (1965).
19. Burford v. Sun Oil Co, 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943):
As a practical matter, the federal courts can make small contribution to
the well organized system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes
provide.... Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal con-
flict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this double system
of review.
The Court avoided discussing the constitutional question involved and hardly mentioned
the uncertainty of state law. Accord, Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry.,
341 U.S. 341 (1951); Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 260 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
20. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
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The background of the third aspect of the abstention doctrine
starts with the statement of the Supreme Court in Meredith v. Winter
Haven.2 The Court held that where jurisdiction of the federal court
is based on diversity of citizenship, the difficulty of ascertaining what
the state law is does not in itself afford a sufficient ground for a federal
court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.22 However, since then,
inroads have been made on the Meredith Doctrine which allow the
federal court, when there are exceptional circumstances present, to stay
proceedings until a state determination of state issues can be had. 3
Precisely when resort to this procedure may be contemplated is un-
clear. At present the decisions of lower federal courts are in a state of
uncertainty.24  Some have abstained in routine diversity cases simply
because the state law was unclear, while other courts have expressly
rejected this view.2 5
The validity and scope of the fourth "abstention doctrine" is ex-
tremely limited. Only one court has relied solely on the excuse of an
overcrowded docket to stay a proceeding while a declaratory judgment
action on the same issue was being pursued in a state court,26 but one
other decision has recognized the court's power to follow such a course.27
Applying the certification procedure in connection with the absten-
tion doctrine will necessitate focusing only on the first and third "ab-
stention doctrines". The second aspect of abstention is inappropriate in
the certification context for when a federal court stays proceedings, in
21. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
22. Id. at 234.
23. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Co., 358 F.2d
347 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962);
A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
24. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 935 (1964); see cases cited note 23 supra.
25. Martain v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1967); Merritt-
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Frazier, 289 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 835
(1961); Penagaricano v. Allen Corp., 267 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1959).
26. P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951).
27. Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970): "The power to
stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the dis-
position of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel and for litigants." A few lower courts have stayed proceedings in similar fact
situations. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949); Weiss v. Doyle, 178
F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But of. Mach-Tronics v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.
1963); Caribbean Sales Associates, Inc. v. Hayes Indus. Inc., 273 F. Supp. 598 (D.P.R.
1967) (the mere fact that a court has an overloaded docket should not per se result in
a stay of the proceedings); 77 HARv. L. REv. 1333 (1964).
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order to avoid or minimize federal interference with state domestic
policy, it is the dismissal of the action, rather than retention of jurisdic-
tion pending a state court determination, which is appropriate.28 By
dismissing the action, the federal court obviates the need for obtaining
answers to unsettled questions of state law by way of certification or
declaratory judgment. It should be noted that any deprivation of federal
rights of either litigant, which might occur in the course of subsequent
litigation in the state court, can be rectified by the Supreme Court upon
review.2 9
The fourth aspect of the abstention doctrine, effective in easing the
congestion of the court docket, has been used infrequently. And, when
it has been applied, the issue of unsettled state law was pending de-
termination in a state court.80 Again, there would be no need for cer-
tification since the federal court could merely await the outcome of the
suit in the state court to have its answer on the issue of state law in-
volved.
The majority of the abstention cases, 8' 1 however, fall within the ambit
of either the first or third "abstention doctrines," and it is here that the
certification procedure has its greatest impact.
CONSEQUENCES OF ABSTENTION
Delay-The basic problem created by the abstention doctrine is the
28. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943), the Court said, 'We
should leave these problems of Texas law to the state court where each may be handled
as 'one more item in a continuous series of adjustments'. . . ." Accord, Martin v.
Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S.
341 (1951); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933); Tomiyasu v. Golden, 358 F.2d 651
(9th Cir. 1966) (due regard for the process of a state court requires the federal court
to dismiss the complaint under the abstention doctrine); cf. Wright, The Abstention
Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 815 (1959) (outright dismissal improper).
29. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349 (1969): "[Alde-
quate state court review of an administrative order based upon predominantly local
factors is available to appellee, [therefore] intervention of a federal court is not neces-
sary for the protection of federal rights."
30. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) (a federal court may
refuse to entertain a declaratory judgment proceeding if state action is already pending
which will settle all issues); Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill.
1967); Amy v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 163 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (federal court
would stay trial for death action until final adjudication of two suits instituted in state
court). See Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending
State Court Suits, 60 COLuM. L. REv. 684 (1960); Comment, Federal Practice: Staying
Federal Proceedings Pending Determination of State Litigation, 18 OILA. L. REv. 169
(1965).
31. See cases cited 1 BAMEON & HoLTzoF, supra note 13, § 64 n. 51; WRIGHT, supra
note 11, § 52 n. 51.
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delay which results when a court stays proceedings and sends the liti-
gants into a state court to obtain an interpretation of state law.8 2 An
often cited example of the length and seriousness of this delay is the
Spector3 3 case which required nearly a decade to adjudicate.
One writer feels that a substantial reason for this delay is the inappro-
priate use of abstention 4 Whether caused by misuse or not, when the
abstention doctrine is applied and the federal court stays proceedings,
the parties must then obtain a decision on the substantive issues from the
highest state court. One way this can be accomplished is by means of
a declaratory judgment proceeding.3 5 Unfortunately, however, not all
states have a direct means available to secure a judgment from the state's
highest court. As a result, the parties must often bring the suit in a
lower state court which has original jurisdiction and reach the higher
court by way of appeal 6
32. Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Absten-
tion Doctrine, 24 F.RD. 481, 489 (1959).
33. Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, granting injunction, 47 F. Supp. 671 (D.
Conn. 1942), rev'd, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. granted, 322 U.S. 721 (1944), ab-
stained, 323 U.S. 101, declaratory judgment suit instituted, 15 Conn. Supp. 205 (1947),
rev'd in part, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A.2d 89 (1948), motion to dissolve injunction denied,
88 F. Supp. 711 (D. Conn. 1949), rev'd, 181 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 340
U.S. 806, re'd, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
34. Kurland, supra note 32, Kurland proposes a solution whereby the state court
would pass on both the federal and state questions when the case is remanded to it.
"[D]irect review of the states high court's resolution of the federal issue by the
Supreme Court would then [be] available." Contra, Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472
(1949).
35. Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. M~mi L. REv. 413
n. 81 (1962).
36. A.A. CODE tit. 7, §§ 156-68 (1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1831 to -1846
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2501 to -2512 (1962); Civi. PROCEDURE CODE §§ 1060 to
1062 (West 1955); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-11-1 to -15 (1963); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-29 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501 to 6503 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN.
87.01 to 87.13 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 110-1101 to -1112 (1959); HAWAII REV. STAT. ch.
632, §§ 632-1 to 632-6 (1968); IDAHo CODE ANN. §§ 10-1201 to -1216 (1948); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 57.1 (Smith-Hurd 1968); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-1101 to -1116 (1968); IoWA
R. Ciw. PRo. 261-269; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1701 to -1703 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
418.005 to .090 (1970); LA. CODE Civ. P o. ANq. arts. 1871-1883 (1961); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5951-63 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 31A, §§ 1-16 (1957); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231A, §§ 1-9 (1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 555.01 to .16 (1947); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 527.010 to .140 (1953); MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-8901 to -8916 (1964); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 25-149 to -21,164 (1965); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 30.010 to .160 (1965); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 491:22 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:16-50 to 2A:16-62 (1950); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-6-1 to 22-6-3 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1969); ND. CENT. CODE
§ 32-23-01 to 32-23-13 (1960); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2721.01 to .15 (Page 1969); 12
OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1651 to 1657 (Supp. 1970); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 28.010 to
1971]
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Expense-Delay is not the only adverse effect of the abstention doc-
trine. Along with the delay goes the increased expense to the litigants
of starting a "second suit" in the state courts and appealing the judgment
to the state's court of last resort.37 These effects are further magnified
by the three-tiered judiciary systems employed in sixteen states.38
Issues to be Decided by the State Court-After a federal court stays
proceedings and sends the litigants into a state court to obtain a declara-
tory judgment, another problem often develops-precisely what issues
is the state court to decide? Some cases have been relatively clear, indi-
cating that the state court was only to decide state issues.8 9 However, a
federal court cannot prevent a state court from deciding a federal ques-
tion if presented.40
CERTIFICATION
The certification procedure can be traced through a long history in
England 41 as well as in the United States.4' Florida was the first state
.160 (1968); PA. STAT. tit. 12, 9§ 831 to 853 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2001 to -2014
(1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS §§ 21-24-1 to 21-24-16 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1101
to -1113 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2524-1, § 1-16 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-33-1 to 78-33-13 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 99 4711 to 4725 (1958); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-578 to -585 (1957); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 99 7.24.010 to .180 (1961); W.VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-13-1 to -16 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §9 269.56(1) to 269.56(16) (1957);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1049 to -1064 (1959). See, COmment, Consequences of Absten-
tion by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1358 (1960).
37. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1969) (abstention
"vould accomplish nothing except require still another law suit with added delay and
expense for all parties); Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention
Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 347-48 (1963) (dis-
couragement of future litigants whose claim is composed of both federal rights inter-
mingled with a claim for state relief or, if a diversity of citizenship claim, the fact that
they may have to traverse two judicial systems).
38. COuNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1966-67 113 (1966).
39. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Thomp-
son v. Magnolia Petroleum CO., 309 U.S. 478 (1940). But see Government and Civic
Employees Organizing Comm., C.1.O. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (plaintiff re-
quired to present federal issues to state court).
40. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 248 N.C. 102, 102 S.E.2d
853 (1958), 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (decision of federal issues final); In re Mack, 386 Pa.
251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486
(W.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (3rd Cir. 1958) (issues relitigated). See a!so
68 HARV. L. REv. 544 (1955); 1 STAN. L. REv. 551 (1949).
41. The British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 63 (9 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 582 (2d ed. 1949)), provided for certification of questions of law
vithin the British Empire. The Foreign Law Ascertainment Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict.,
c. 11 (9 HASBRY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 584 (2d ed. 1949)), made provisions for cer-
tification of questions to foreign states.
42. 28 U.S.C. H9 1254-55 (1958). Allows for certified questions from federal courts
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to adopt a certification procedure authorizing the Supreme Court of
Florida to receive and answer certified questions of state law from fed-
eral appellate courts.43 The constitutionality of this procedure was up-
held in Suns Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay,44 where the Florida Supreme
Court concluded that
in the absence of a constitutional provision expressly or by
necessary implication limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to those matters expressly conferred upon it, and in the
absence of a constitutional provision expressly conferring upon
another court jurisdiction to exercise the judicial power which is
the subject matter of § 25.031 and Rule 4.61, and in the light of the
well settled rule that all sovereign power, including the judicial
power, "not limited by a state constitution inheres to the people
of [the] state", such power may be granted to this court by
statute if it is deemed to be substantive matter or by a rule of this
court if it is deemed to be a matter of "practice and procedure." 45
However, it was not until 1960 (fifteen years after the enactment of
Florida section 25.031) that the United States Supreme Court for the
first time suggested that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit make
use of the Florida procedure. 46 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, expressing the
opinion of the Court, stated,
The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the
problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law in-
volved in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal
I
of appeals and the Court of Claims to the United States Supreme Court. See Moore &
Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35
VA. L. Rv. 1 (1949).
43. Originally enacted by the Florida legislature in ch. 23098, § 1 [1945] Fla. Laws
1291 which later became FiA. STAT. AN. § 25.031 (1961).
44. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
45. Id. at 742-43. The Supreme Court of Maine in upholding the constitutionality of
its certification statute has held that answering questions certified to it was not a for-
bidden advisory opinion under its constitution so long as the state court's decision, in
fact, was determinative of the case. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me. 1966).
We conclude as did the Florida court that our participation in the certifi-
cation procedure will constitute a valid exercise of "judicial power"....
We are satisfied that more will be involved than the mere rendering of a
purely advisory' opinion. This certification by the federal court becomes
by the force of our statute the jurisdictional vehicle for placing the matter
before the court for its action.
46. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Su-
preme Court of Florida for its decision.47
Since the Clay decision, five other states, Hawaii, 48 Maine,4 Mon-
tana,50 New Hampshire,"1 and Washington,52 have provided for the
certification of questions of state law from a federal court to the states'
highest courts. For an analysis of the content of the above acts or rules
see Chart II infra.
OBJECTIONS TO CERTIFICATION
Abstractness and Advisory Opinions-The first objection usually
voiced against certification is its abstractness. 53 Abstractness results from
the fact that the questions certified are severed from the facts which
"spawned them." 14 Were a federal court to certify a question to a
state court, posed in the form of an abstract question, and then incor-
porate the advisory state court answer into its final adjudication of the
case, the result might well be a clear violation of the "case or contro-
versy" 55 principle."6 By way of emphasis, it has been seen that state
47. Id. at 212. Justice Black, dissenting, felt that the questions of state law were not
so vague or ambiguous as to require certification. Id. at 213. As to the use of certified
questions, Black argued that the Supreme Court of Florida had never formulated any
rules of court whereby section 25.031 could be carried into practice. Id. at 226. See
FLA. APP. R. 4.61.
48. HAwMI REv. STAT. § 602-36 (1968).
49. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tic. 4, § 57 (1964), as amended ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, 57
(Supp. 1970); ME. R. Civ. P. 76B.
50. MONT. Sup. CT. R. 1. The Montana Rule is quoted in Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins.
Co., 278 F. Supp. 283, 240 n.3 (D. Mont. 1967).
51. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 490: App. R. 21 (1968).
52. WAsH. REv. CoDE ANN. ch. 2.60 (Supp. 1969).
53. See generally Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical
Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MiAMI L. REv. 717, 734 (1969); Vestal,
The Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REv. 629, 646 (1951); Note, Inter-Jurisdic-
tional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative judicial Federalim, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 344, 350-57 (1963); Comment, Inter-Sovereign Certification as an Answer
to the Abstention Problem, 21 LA. L. REv. 777, 780-83 (1961); 40 ThxAs L. REv. 1041,
1044-46 (1962).
54. Note, supra note 53, at 350.
55. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1I, § 2.
56. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 277, 240-41 (1937).
A controversy ... must be one that is appropriate for judicial determina-
tion [and] ... is ... distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypo-
thetical or abstract character .... It must be a real and substantial con-
troversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.
See also Moore & Vestal, supra note 42.
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courts will not answer a completely abstract question of state law that
arises by way of state intra-jurisdictional certification procedures."7 In
theory this may evolve into a fundamental problem of significant pro-
portions for inter-jurisdictional certification, but in practice the prob-
lem has not materialized. 8
The problems of abstractness and advisory opinions have become
even more unconvincing in light of the strict requirements of most
certification procedures." These procedures generally require that the
contents of the certification order contain a statement of all facts rele-
vant to the questions certified and fully show the nature of the contro-
versy in which the question arose. ° Additionally, to obviate the prob-
lems of advisory opinions, most states require that the answer to the
question certified be determinative of the case."' The procedure of cer-
tifying all relevant facts to the state court when coupled with the re-
quirement that the state court decision be determinative of the issues
57. Note, supra note 53, at 351 n. 54.
58. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A.2d 89 (1948); See Jus-
tice Musmanno's dissent in In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679, 699 (1956): "The
decision of the majority in this case is a stranger to justice because it is based on a
premise which has no factual existence." Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735
(Fla. 1961) (the court avoided the issue of justiciability by basing its jurisdiction on
state law); Leiter Minerals Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).
59. By constitutional provision: e.g., COLO. CONSr. art. 6, § 3 (1886); FLA. CoNsr. art.
V, § 16 (1885); ME. CoNsT. art. 6, § 3; MAss. CoNsT. art. 2, ch. 3 (1780); N.H. CoNsr.
art. 74, part 2 (1784); R. I. CONsT. art. 10, § 2 (1843); S.D. CoNsr. art. 5, § 13 (1889).
By legislation: e.g., DEL. CODE AN. tit. 10, § 141 (1953); LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN.
arts. 1871-83 (1961). See generally Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND.
LJ. 203 (1949).
60. FLA. APP. R. 4.61(d); N.H. REv. STAT. AN. ch. 490: APP. R. 21, §§ 3, 4 (1968)
(this court may require the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record
before the certifying court to be filed with the certification order, if, in the opinion
of this court, the record or portion thereof may be necessary in answering the questions);
ME. R. Cxv. P. 76B (b); WASH. REv. CODE Aix. H§ 2.60.010 (4), (5), 2.60.030 (2) (Supp.
1970); UNIORM CERTIFCATION OF QUtsTIONs OF LAW [AcT] [RuLE] § 3; see Chart II
infra.
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961); FLA. APP. R. 4.61a, (but see Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1963); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 602-36, -37 (1968)
("questions . . . which are determinative of the cause .. ."); WAsH. RFv. CODE ANx. §
2.60.020 (Supp. 1969); ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (1964), as amended ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (Supp. 1970) interpreted by In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me.
1966). The Maine court felt that if it was to participate in the action and yet not
render a purely advisory opinion, it would require from the "certification itself, that all
material facts have been either agreed upon or found by the court and that the case is
in such posture in all respects that our decision as to the applicable Maine law will in
fact be 'determinative of the cause' . . . ." 223 A.2d at 833.
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involved should satisfy almost all the states' requirement of a justiciable
controversy.12
Certification Violates the Federal Constitution-The attack upon con-
stitutionality has been based upon the fact that judicial power is given
to the federal courts by authority other than that established by
Article III of the Constitution. 3 A corollary to this objection is that
the litigants will be deprived of their right to a federal adjudication if
a state court is to determine the issues 4
The validity of the above arguments fail when viewed in light of
Erie. The Erie Court held that there is no delegation of federal judicial
power to state courts since that power does not include the making of
state law. 5 Certification would, in fact, seem to further the "spirit of
Erie," uniform interpretation of state law, in that regardless of which
forum a party were to choose, state or federal, the state law would be
applied similarly. Whatever question of constitutionality existed seems
to have been put to rest by the Supreme Court in Clay v. Sun Office
Ltd.,60 advocating the use of Florida's certification procedure and its
subsequent application by the Court in later cases.
67
Delay-The certification procedure has been criticized for the delay
which has resulted from its use."' The prime example often cited is
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.' However, most of the time required
for litigation of this case was consumed in the federal court system.
After abstention, the actual amount of time involved in certifying the
question to the Florida Supreme Court and obtaining an answer was
62. E.g., Riley v. County of Cochise, 10 Ariz. App. 55, 455 P.2d 1005, 1009 (1969)
("In every declaratory judgment action, there must be sufficient factual allegations to
outline a justiciable controversy"); Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Toberman, 301
S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1957); City of Joplin v. Jasper County, 349 Mo. 441, 161 S.W.2d 411
(1942); Parks v. Francis, 202 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). See 40 TFxAs L. REv.
1041, 1044 n. 29 (1962).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
64. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 443-44 (1923). Cf. National
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); O'Donoghue v. United
States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
65. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 305 U.S. 64, 78-9 (1938).
66. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
67. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249 (1963); Dressner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S.
136 (1963).
68. Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands
of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MiAMi L. Riv. 717, 725-27 (1969).
69. United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, rev'd, 265 F.2d
522 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated, 363 U.S. 207 (1960), question certified, (noted in) 319 F.2d
505 (5th Cir. 1963), certified question answered, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961), rev'd, 319
F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
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433 days.70 When compared with an average of 876 days for similar
abstention cases in which the certification procedure was not available,
it can be seen that there is a substantial reduction of delay. It should be
emphasized that a major factor which caused the Florida Supreme Court
to respond slowly in Clay was the lack of applicable court rules; these
rules had to be adopted before the court could answer.7' Since Clay
only one other case has taken as long.72
Another aspect of delay involved in certification is the delay caused
by the condition of the state court's docket. When a question is certi-
fied, the state supreme court is confronted with yet another case to be
added to its already overcrowded docket.73 Since all certification proce-
dures presently in effect allow the state court to decline to answer a ques-
tion certified,7 4 this would seem to be the course to follow if the court
is faced with an overcrowded docket. Such a solution may, however,
simply delay the inevitable, since the only other alternative available to
the litigants is to start a declaratory judgment proceeding which will
eventually appear on the court docket by way of appeal. Thus, certifica-
tion would save the state time and money by avoiding numerous lower
court trials and appeals.
Forum Shopping-Since one of the thrusts of the Erie doctrine is the
elimination of forum shopping by litigants,7 federal courts have demon-
strated that they will consider the use of certification even after a
decision on the merits has been reached.7 6 Thus a litigant who loses a
case due to the court's determination of state law could request the
court after the trial to certify such question of state law to the state for
an authoritative answer. If the resulting interpretation of state law is
favorable to the moving party, the judgment may be vacated.
70. Question certified August 12, 1960, see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 319 F.2d 505,
508 (5th Cir. 1960). Question answered October 18, 1961, see 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
71. FLA. APP. R. 4.61.
72. Question certified March 24, 1966, see Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 385
F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966). Question answered February 1, 1967, and corrected on July
12, 1967, see 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967) (490 days).
73. Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74 Wash. 2d 679, 445 P.2d 1012, 1014-15 (1968)
(Hale, J., dissenting): "At the time the instant case was argued in this court, . . . this
court had pending a backlog of approximately 700 cases, some of which were of high
precedential value and of exigent importance to the parties .... I believe that it re-
ceived an undeserved priority on the calendar."
74. Note 3, supra.
75. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-5 (1938).
76. Vandercook and Sons, Inc. v. Thorpe, 322 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1963), rehearing,
344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir.
1962).
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This situation, however, seems easily rectifiable. Most federal courts
certify upon their own motion or grant permission to certify to a moving
party.77 Certification is therefore discretionary with the court. This
discretionary power could be used to deny the use of certification after
a judgment on the merits has been reached. Alternatively, the federal
court might deem waived the right of the litigants to certify a question
in the absence of a motion for certification before the court rules on the
matter of state law.
Available Only to an Appellate Court-Two states restrict the use of
certification to federal appellate courts. 8 The reason for this restriction
is the state court's fear that federal district court certificates would
flood the state court dockets.79 It has been proposed that federal district
courts could get around this restriction if Congress merely were to
allow them to certify a question to an appellate court. The appellate
court in turn could certify the question to the state's highest court, thus
circumventing the state restriction. 0
It seems that the best solution is for a state in adopting a certification
procedure to follow the Uniform Act' which allows a district court to
certify. 2 The fear of "flooding" is ill-founded since answering the cer-
tificate is discretionary. 3 Aside from the power to decline to answer, it
seems that the federal district court, being better advised of local law
and situated so as to make knowing decisions on state law, will be less
likely to certify a question. 4 The four other states with certification
procedures8"5 allow federal district courts to certify questions to their
courts; yet, the courts in these states have not been faced with flooding
of their dockets by such certificates. 86
77. See Chart I, § 1 infra.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961); FLA. APP. R. 4.61(a); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 602-
36,-37 (1968).
79. Comment, Certification to State Courts: Progress in the Field of Federal Absten-
tion, 36 TuL. L. REv. 571, 574 (1962).
80. Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413,
430-31 (1962).
81. UNIFORM CRM NcTON OF QUTONS OF LAW [Acr] [RuLE].
82. Id. § 1.
83. See Chart 11, § 2 infra.
84. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1955).
85. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (1964), as amended ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4,
§ 57 (Supp. 1970); ME. R. Civ. P. 76B; MONT. Sup. CT. R. 1; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
490; APP. R. 21, § 1 (1968); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.60.010(2) (Supp. 1969).
86. Certification has been sparingly used by the United States district courts which




Achieves the Objectives of Abstention and Promotes Federalism-
Although there have been some problems attending the utilization of
the certification procedure,87 they seem inconsequential when viewed
in the light of the advantages to be gained by its use.
By using the certification procedure, the federal courts prevent federal
intrusion into the state law-making function. The procedure represents
a better attempt at cooperative judicial federalism, evincing concern for
state sovereignty through an efficient and simple proceeding.A8
The feeling that the federal court [is] cooperating in the search
for state law rather than seeking to impose its will upon the state
might even make state judges more receptive to federal views,
when federal questions [are] before state judiciaries.8 9
In seeking a state determination of state issues, a federal court that
applies the abstention doctrine severs itself from the case, leaving the
state to make an independent determination of the state law issues.
When certification is used, the federal court participates in the resolution
of the entire case by framing the state law questions, specifying rele-
vant facts and legal issues and certifying directly to the state's highest
court.
Promotion of the "Spirit" of Erie-Consistency in Result-One of the
foundations of the Erie Doctrine is that the result of litigation should
not depend on whether the suit is brought in a state or federal court. 0
Federal judges have often felt the burden of deciding issues of state law
without assurance that their decision would be consistent with a later
determination of the same issue by a state court 1 As Judge Friendly
phrased the problem,
Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to de-
tification was used: District Court of Maine (2); District Court, Western District of
Washington (2); District Court of New Hampshire (0); District Court of Montana (1).
87. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
88. Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative
Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 344 (1963).
89. Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means and
Confusion of Goals", 73 YArz L. J. 850, 865 (1964).
90. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-7 (1938).
91. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly,
J., concurring); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 249 F.2d
847, 853 (7th Cir. 1957) (Finnegan, CJ., concurring).
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termine what the New York courts would think the California
courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought.92
Many times, especially in areas where state law is unclear, a federal
court has decided the state law inaccurately. 93  This results in an in-
justice to the litigants when a state court later decides the state law in-
volved differently.94 In such situations,95 federal courts have at times
granted petitions for rehearing to undo a previous decision. 7 By using
certification, a federal court can eliminate any guesswork as to state law
and assure the litigants a decision based on authoritative state law.98
In evaluating the certification procedure, it is helpful to consult the
courts which have made use of it and note their comments. Circuit
Judge Brown, in Martinez v. Rodriquez9 9 expressed his thoughts on
certification in the following words:
Once again we witness the effectiveness-both substantive and
administrative-of Florida's remarkably helpful certification pro-
cedure by which the Florida Supreme Court determines for us the
92. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 365 U.S. 293,
(1960), on remand, 290 F.2d 904 (1961).
93. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962). The Ala-
bama Supreme Court categorically rejected the views previously expressed by the federal
court in New York Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961); Truck Ins. Ex-
change v. Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521 (1960), expressly rejecting National
Surety Corp. v. Bellah, 245 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1957); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trussell,
131 So. 2d 730 (1961), expressly disapproving Pogue v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957).
94. W. S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir. 1967) (Brown,
J, concurring and dissenting), rev'd sub nom, Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.,
391 U.S. 592 (1968).
95. Barnes v. Threshermen and Farmers Mutual Casualty Co., 146 So. 2d 119 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 153 So. 2d 305 (Fla.).
96. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hallat, 326 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1964).
97. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hallat, 295 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1961).
98. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Shiffler, 359 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1966) (upheld a
jury verdict against the insurance company under the construction of the Florida In-
surance Statutes concerning fraudulent misrepresentation), motion for rehearing granted,
370 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1967) (question certified to Supreme Court of Florida), certified
question answered, 201 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1967) (reaching a result opposite that reached
in the original fifth circuit opinion). On receipt of the answer to the certified question
the earlier judgment was vacated and the case remanded to the district court. 380 F.2d
375. See also Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966). The district court in an
earlier decision, Buckley v. Basford, 184 F. Supp. 870 (D. Me. 1960), decided the same
issue as to state law, only to find it had decided wrongly when the Maine Supreme
Court met the issue in Norton.
99. 410 F.2d 729 (1969).
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controlling question of Florida law. ... For example, while this
Court following the footsteps of the stalwarts below might have
reached the same conclusion as that of the Florida Court with re-
spect to the issue in this case, our decision would have had no
assurance of predictable correctness. No matter how many Fed-
eral Judges, trial, appellate, three-judge panel, or the full panoply
of the court en banc, any decision would have been an Erie-guess.
Now the guesswork has been eliminated, and we are quickly pre-
sented with a definitive explication of Florida law. 00
Judge Brown is only one of many who have extolled the virtues of the
certification procedure.101
Defines the Issue(s) to be Decided-Control by the federal court of
the form of the question certified and the accompanying record assures
that the right question will be answered on the proper facts. 10 2 This
cures one of the problems attending abstention-what issues are to be
decided by the state court?103
The federal courts have given, in their certified questions, the widest
latitude to the highest state court in reaching a decision.0 4 The empha-
sis has been that the particular phrasing used in the certification ques-
tion should not preclude the state court from considering the problems
and issues involved as the state court perceives them. This latitude ex-
tends to the restatement of the issue or issues and to the manner in which
the answers are to be given.105
100. Id. at 730.
101. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1963):
[T]o the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida we wish to express
publicly and with deep sincerity our appreciation for their answer to the
question which we certified to that Court. That answer has saved this Court,
through the writer as its organ, from committing a serious error as to the
law of Florida which might have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.
The Supreme Court of Florida has been a very real help in the administra-
tion of justice.
See, e.g., Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 409 F.2d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1969);
Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida Su-
preme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 413
(1962); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in
Diversity Cases, 67 YAE LEJ. 187, 214 (1957); Comment, Certification to State Courts:
Progress in the Field of Federal Abstention, 36 TUm. L. REv. 571 (1962); cf. Mattis,
Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the
Federal Courts, 23 MIAMI L. REv. 717 (1969).
102. Am, STUDY oF Tm DIsIoN oF JumsDicTION BETWEEN STATE AN FEDERAL CouRTs
293 (1969).
103. See text accompanying notes 39 and 40 supra.
104. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 358 F.2d 347, 349 n.2 (5th Cir. 1966).
105. Martinez v. Rodriquez, 394 F.2d 156, 159 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Protection of Federal Rights-In obtaining authoritative answers to
questions of state law the federal court retains jurisdiction in order to
preserve for the litigants their right to a federal adjudication of the
facts and issues of law not certified. If for some reason the state court
does not respond, or does not respond expeditiously, the federal court
may proceed to decide the issue of state law,106 thus protecting any
federal rights of the litigants to a "just, speedy, and inexpensive" trial.1°7
Avoids Delay and Expense Caused by the Abstention Doctrine-Be-
sides carrying out the objectives of abstention and the Erie Doctrine,
obtaining authoritative answers to unsettled questions of state law, and
generally promoting federalism, certification avoids the delay and ex-
pense attending the abstention doctrine.
A cross-section of abstention cases, some utilizing certification, 10 8
and some not,0 9 were analyzed to determine the reduction in delay
attributable to use of the certification procedure. The time segment
compared began the day on which the federal court abstained and con-
tinued to the day on which the state's highest court rendered an answer
as to the state law involved. The first group of cases did not have the
certification procedure available. As a result, in all of these cases, a
declaratory judgment suit was required to obtain an answer from the
state court. 10 The average time required to get an answer in this
manner was 876 days (over two years)."' This can be compared with
287 days (less than ten months) 1 2 for cases where certification was
utilized.
The large savings in time is further accented when cases in which
certification was used are further analyzed. Both Washington and
Maine have been asked few certified questions. 1 3 It may be assumed
that lack of experience has caused these courts to fail to reach their
peak of proficiency in answering certified questions. Florida is the only
state which has answered a substantial number of certification questions
over the last ten years." 4 Its familiarity with certified cases is evi-
106. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31 (1959).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
108. Cases cited notes 123-25 infra.
109. Cases cited note 121 infra.
110. Id.; statutes cited note 36 supra.
111. See Chart I infra.
112. Id.
113. Cases cited notes 125-26 infra. Maine and Washington together have answered
only five reported cases certified to them.
114. Cases cited notes 122-24 infra.
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denced by its having the lowest average time, 240 days,11 5 of all the
states. When viewed over the ten-year period it can be seen that the
more cases certified the more proficient the Florida Supreme Court has
become in answering.1 Chief Judge Brown expressed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's feeling as to the benefit of certification when he said:
We certified the case on March 24, 1966. The first Opinion of
the Florida Supreme Court was handed down within ten months
on February 1, 1967. We have been able to dispose of it without
further resubmission or argument. In these days of our exploding
docket and the unavoidable delay as we try to cope with our over-
crowded case load,... this slight period of time to afford Florida
the opportunity to settle the issue presented demonstrates that
delay really is not an insurmountable problem in the certification
procedure and certainly it never need to be."17
Hopefully inter-jurisdictional certification will attain the level of
efficiency found in some state court intra-jurisdictional certification
procedures."" However, even now, the certification procedure, where
it is available, results in a saving to the litigants of, on the average, some
589 days," 9 not to mention the financial saving. This fact alone should
prompt federal courts to make use of certification if it is available.
CONCLUSION
As long as the federal judicial system subscribes to the theory and
"spirit" of the Erie Doctrine and continues to effectuate its use through
the abstention doctrine, the need for accurate interpretation of state
law will continue. The typical state declaratory judgment proceed-
ing, when used in conjunction with abstention, has proved to be a
slow, inefficient, and an inaccurate way of assessing state law. The cer-
tification procedure on the other hand was developed for and fits the
needs of the federal court system. Its use will give a federal court the
tools for obtaining authoritative state determinations of state law. The
115. See Chart I infra.
116. Id.
117. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 657 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968).
118. Speer v. State, 27 Ala. App. 579, 583-84, 177 So. 162, 166 (1937) (answered certi-
fied question the same day); Georgia Power Co. v. Watts, 56 Ga. App. 322, 192 S.E.
493 (1937) (case returned within ten days after answering); TEx. Sup. CT. R. 477 (certi-
fied questions acted on immediately).
119. The average certification time for all the certification cases analyzed: 287 days.
Average time for cases not using certification: 876 days.
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best recommendation for the use of certification comes from the judges,
and courts which have utilized it. Chief Judge Brown seems to have
expressed a most logical conclusion when he stated:
There are, to be sure, purists who somehow feel that a struggle
of uncertainty leading even to the likelihood of an erroneous but
speedy result is better than the slight time it takes to get an author-
itative answer. But so long as Florida is with us and has this re-
sponsive mechanism that not only lights our lights but keeps us
straight at the same time, this tribunal is grateful for the substitu-
tion of certainty for the somewhat scholastic, always uncertain,
exploration into what local Judges would say they would say the
local law is.
With dispatch and positiveness Florida answers the Florida ques-
tion. What more could one want?' 20
JOHN A. SCANELLI
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i With Certification
121. Delaney v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Tex. 1961), aff'd,
308 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1962), abstained, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
935 (1964), declaratory judgment suit instituted and dismissed, 37th District Court of
Bexar County, aft'd, 386 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.
1965) (the affirmance was based on the fact that the case was still pending in the federal
courts and that Texas state courts did not have constitutional authority to render an
advisory opinion), rev'd, 358 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Bennett, abstained, 178 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Ark. 1959), judgment vacated,
360 U.S. 471 (but the litigants carried the intervening declaratory judgment suit to a
conclusion), Chancery Court, First Division, Pulaski County, afi'd, 370 S.W.2d 79
(1963); Leiter Minerals Inc. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. La. 1954), aff'd,
224 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 964, modified and abstained, 352
U.S. 320 (1957), declaratory judgment suit instituted, 25th Judicial District Court for
the Parish of Plaquemines, Nos. 4240, 6708 (being unable to agree on the form of the
declaratory judgment petition, the court drew its own, No. 4557). The opinion of the
district judge is reproduced in the dissenting opinion of Justice Hamlin in 241 La. 915,
132 So. 2d 845, 846 (1961)), no jurisdiction, 289 La. 116, 118 So. 2d 124 (1960), rev'd,
126 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App. 1961), rev'd, 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845, decided, 204 F.
Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1962); Shipman v. Du Pre, 88 F. Supp. 482 (E.D.S.C.), judgment
vacated-abstained, 339 U.S. 321 (1950), declaratory judgment suit instituted, The Com-
mon Pleas Court of Beaufort County, aff'd, 222 S.C. 475, 73 S.E.2d 716 (1952); Gov-
ernment and Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, abstained, 116 F.
Supp. 354 (NJD. Ala. 1953), declaratory judgment suit instituted, Circuit Court of
Montgomery County in Equity, Alabama, affd, 262 Ala. 285, 78 So. 2d 646 (1955),
decided, 146 F. Supp. 214 (ND. Ala. 1956), prob. juris. noted, 352 U.S. 905, judgment
vacated, 353 US. 364 (1957); England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,
dismissed for lack of substantial federal question, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, rev'd, 259 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1958), rehearing denied, 263
F.2d 661, abstained, 180 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. La. 1960), declaratory judgment suit insti-
tuted, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, aff'd, 126 So. 2d 51
(La. 5th Cir. Ct. App. 1960), dismissed, 194 F. Supp. 521 (ED. La. 1961) (the state
court passed on all issues including federal constitutional issues), prob. juris. noted, 372
U.S. 904, rev'd, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibo-
daux, abstained, 153 F. Supp. 515 (ED. La. 1957), rev'd, 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. granted, 358 U.S. 893, rev'd, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), declaratory judgment suit insti-
tuted, 17th Judicial District Court, Lafourche Parish, aft'd, 126 So. 2d 24 (La. 1st Cit.
Ct. App. 1960). The above cases were the only ones completely reported, and which
thereby provided the necessary dates needed for computation. For a complete list of
cases in which abstention has been applied see 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF supra, note 13,
§ 64.
122. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida, rev'd, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959), judg7nent vacated, 363 U.S. 207 (1960),
question certified, (as reported in) 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), question answered, 133
So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961), rev'd, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd 377 U.S. 179 (1964);
Aldrich v. Aldrich, complaint dismissed, Circuit Court of Pumnam County, aff'd, 147
W.Va. 269, 127 S.E.2d 385 (1962), question certified, 375 U.S. 249 (1963), question an-
swered, 163 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1964), decided, 378 U.S. 540; Dresner v. City of Talla-
hassee, Municipal Court, City of Tallahassee, transferred for lack of jurisdiction, 134 So.
2d 228 (Fla. 1961), aff'd, Circuit Court of Florida, Second Judicial Circuit (reported
in Appendix, 375 U.S. 136), cert. granted, 372 U.S. 963, question certified, 375 U.S. 136
(1963), question answered, 164 So. 2d 208 (Fla.), decided, 378 U.S. 539 (1964); Green
v. American Tobacco Co., United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, question certified, 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cit. 1962), question answered, 154 So. 2d
169 (Fla. 1963), reed, 325 F.2d 673, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
123. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, question certified, 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966), question
answered, 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967), decided, 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968); Life Ins.
Co. of Va. v. Shiflet, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
aff'd, 359 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1966), question certified, 370 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), ques-
tion answered, 201 So. 2d 715 (Fla.), rev'd, 380 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967); Martinez v. Rod-
riques, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, question certi-
fied, 394 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), question answered, 215 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1968), aff'd, 410
F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969); Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, question certified, (reported in) 409 F.2d 32
(5th Cir. 1969), question answered, 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 32 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 900, rev'd, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
124. Gaston v. Pittman, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, question certified, 405 F.2d 869 (5th Cir.), question answered, 224 So. 2d 326
(Fla.), rev'd, 413 F.2d 1031 (1969); Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, decided to certify question, 409 F.2d
1059 (5th Cir. 1969), question certified, 410 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.), question answered, 235
So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970).
125. Thiry v. The Atlantic Monthly Co., United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, question certified, August 2, 1967, question answered, 74 Wash.
2d 679, 445 P.2d 1012 (1968); In re Elliott, United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, questioned certified, December 12, 1966, question answered, 74
Wash. 2d 606, 446 P.2d 347 (1968).
126. Pierce v. Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of E.E.W., question certified (reported in)
302 F. Supp. 508 (D. Me. 1968), question answered, 254 A.2d 46 (Me. 1969), decided,
302 F. Supp. 508 (D. Me. 1968); In re Richards, United States District Court of Maine
ordered the question certified, reconsideration denied, 253 F. Supp. 913 (D. Me. 1966) ,
question not answered-facts in dispute, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966), decided, 272 F. Supp.
480 (D. Me. 1967).
649"1971] CERTIFICATION







§ 1. Who can certify a question?
U. S. Supreme Court Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
U. S. Courts of Appeals Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
U. S. District Courts No134  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yesln
D. C. Court of Appeals Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Another State Court 138 Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes
§ 2. The state supreme court
must answer
may answer
a question certified to
it.
No No No No No No No
Yes1I 7 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes138 Yes
§ 3. The certified question
must Yes13 9 Yes Yes 140 No No Yes No
may No No No Yes141 Yes No Yes
be determinative of the
case.
(continued at 652)
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961); FLA. App. R. 4.61.
128. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 602-36, -37 (1968).
129. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (Supp. 1970).
130. MONT. Sup. CT. R. 1.
131. Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Rule, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
490: App. RK 21 (1968).
132. Federal Court Law Certificate Procedure Act, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 2.60
(Supp. 1969).
133. UNwIORM CERTmCATION OF QuEsnoNs OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] (1967). The UNi-
FOaM ACT provides the following:
SECTON 1. [Power to Answer.] The [Supreme Court] may answer ques-
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tions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a
Court of Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court [or
the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of any other
state], when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any
proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determina-
tive of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it
appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the de-
cisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts] of
this state.
SEcroN 2. [Method of Invoking.] This [Act] [Rule] may be invoked
by an order of any of the courts referred to in section 1 upon the court's
own motion or upon the motion of any party to the cause.
SEmON 3. [Contents of Certification Order.] A certification order shall
set forth
(1) the questions of law to be answered; and
(2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing
fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose.
SEcnON 4. [Preparation of Certification Order.] The certification order
shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed by the judge presiding at
the hearing, and forwarded to the [Supreme Court] by the clerk of the
certifying court under its official seal. The [Supreme Court] may require
the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the certi-
fying court to be filed with the certification order, if, in the opinion of the
[Supreme Court], the record or portion thereof may be necessary in an-
swering the questions.
SEcTioN 5. [Costs of Certification.] Fees and costs shall be the same as
in [civil appeals] docketed before the [Supreme Court] and shall be equally
divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court
in its order of certification.
SECTION 6. [Briefs and Argument.] Proceedings in the [Supreme Court]
shall be those provided in [local rules or statutes governing briefs and argu-
ments].
SECnoN 7. [Opinion.] The written opinion of the [Supreme Court]
stating the law governing the questions certified shall be sent by the clerk
under the seal of the Supreme Court to the certifying court and to the
parties.
[SECrioN 8. [Power to Certify.] The [Supreme Court] [or the inter-
mediate appellate courts] of this state, on [its] [their] own motion or the
motion of any party, may order certification of questions of law to the
highest court of any state when it appears to the certifying court that there
are involved in any proceeding before the court questions of law of the
receiving state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the
certifying court and it appears to the certifying court that there are no con-
trolling precedents in the decisions of the highest court or intermediate
appellate courts of the receiving state.]
[SECTION 9. [Procedure on Certifying.] The procedures for certifica-
tion from this state to the receiving state shall be those provided in the laws
of the receiving state.]
SECTION 10. [Severability.] If any provision of this [Act] [Rule] or the
application thereof to any person, court, or circumstance is held invalid, the
invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the [Act]
[Rule] which can be given effect without the invalid provision or appica-
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§I1. Certification can be in-
voked by a federal court:
Upon its own motion Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Upon the motion of an
interested party
with approval of court Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
without approval of No Yes Yes No Yes
court
§ 2. Contents of the certificate
must include:
Question(s) of law to be Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
answered
Statement of facts144 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
§ 3. Cost of the certificate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
should be equally divided145
tion, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] [Rule] are severable.
SEMcTON 11. [Construction.] This [Act] [Rule] shall be construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
SECToN 12. [Short Title.] This [Act] [ Rule] may be cited as the Uni-
form Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule].
SEmCToN 13. [Time of Taking Effect.] This [Act] [Rule] shall take
effect ...
134. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 25.031 (1961) (includes the Court of Appeals forthe District of Columbia) with FLA. App. R. 4.61(a) ("any of the Courts of Appeals of
the United States").
135. UNivomv CERIFICATION OF Qu-snoNs OF LAW [AcT] [RULE] § 1 (1967) ("A
Court of Appeals of the United States").
136. Although this note does not concern itself with inter-jurisdictional certificationbetween states, it is interesting to see that a majority of state supreme courts have the
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power to adopt rules to effectuate such certification. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.032 (1961);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 602-36-37 (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 490: App. R. 21 § 8
(1968) (the court is given the power to certify questions of law to the highest court of
any state but not to receive such questions). Since the New Hampshire statute is based
on the Uniform Act, it would seem that the intent of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court was to adopt section 1 of the Uniform Act including the bracketed portion of
lines 4 and 5.
137. The Supreme Court of Florida received a certified question from a Florida
District Court of Appeal and held that the word "may" should not be construed as
"shall", and therefore refused to answer the certified question. Stein v. Darby, 134
So. 2d 232, 237 (Fla. 1961).
138. The word "shall" was construed by the Supreme Court of Washington to be
permissive. In re Elliott, - Wash. -, 446 P.2d 347, 353 (1968).
139. The Florida statute and appellate rules say the question(s) certified must be
"determinative of said cause." FLA. STAT. Am. § 25.031 (1961); FLA. APP. R. 4.61a.
But see Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1963) (the court
answered the certified question but indicated that the inquiry did not request a response
to the ultimate issue of liability).
140. The statute reads "one or more questions of law of this State which may be de-
terminative of the cause...." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (Supp. 1970), ME. R.
Civ. P. 76B (emphasis added); but see In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966)
where the court construed the statute such that its response ".will be 'determinative of
the cause' . . . ." ; accord Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966).
141. MoNTr. S. CT. R. 1. All that the Montana rule requires is "that the question
upon which adjudication is sought is controlling in the federal litigation and adjudica-
tion by the Montana Supreme Court will materially advance termination of the federal
litigation ... " Lewis v. Mid-Century Inc. Co., 278 F. Supp. 238, 240 n.3 (D. Mont.
1967).
142. The Hawaii Supreme Court, while authorized to adopt rules to effectuate the
act, has not done so as of this writing.
143. Montana's procedure is based on its declaratory judgment procedure with a
slight modification. See Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 238, 240 n.3 (D.
Mont. 1967).
144. The extent to which facts are included varies among the states: FLA. App. R.
4.61 (d) (facts "showing the nature of the cause and the circumstances out of which the
questions .. . arise. . . ."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 490: App. R. 21, § 3(2) (1968)
("a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully the nature
of the controversy in which the question arose"); accord, UNnuoR~x CERTIFCATION OF
QuaSrIONS OF LAw [ACr] [Rr.EI] § 3(2); ME. R. Civ. P. 76B(b) ("a statement of facts
showing the nature of the case and the circumstances out of which the question of law
arises... "'); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.60.030(2) (Supp. 1969) ("Certificate procedure
shall include and be based upon the record and may include a supplemental record.").
For a definition of "record" and "supplemental record" see id. § 2.60.010(4),(5)).
145. All of the states provide that the costs shall be divided between the parties,
subject in some cases to reallocation by the federal (certifying) court: N.H. Rav. STAT.
ANN. ch. 490: App. R. 21, § 5 (1968); WAsir. REv. CODE ANx. § 2.60.030(3) (Supp. 1969);
UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QuEs-noNs OF LAW [Acr] [RuLE] § 5; and in the others by
the states' high courts: FLA. APP. R. 4.61(f); ME. R. Civ. P. 76B (d).
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